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Corporations
By WILLBURT D. HAm*
The approach taken to the Corporations section of the
present Survey will be similar to that taken in previous Sur-
veys.' Part I will be devoted to three significant decisions by
the Supreme Court of the United States relating to federal
corporation law. Part II, dealing with developments in state
corporation law, will direct attention to a Kentucky securities
law case, a recent court decision from a Model Act jurisdiction
interpreting statutory provisions similar to those contained in
the Kentucky Business Corporation Act, and a recent legisla-
tive development in Kentucky pertaining to corporate take-
overs.
I. FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW
A. SEC Rule 10b-5
The flood of litigation under SEC Rule 10b-5, 2 which pro-
hibits fraudulent or deceptive conduct in the purchase or sale
of securities,3 continues to pour forth from the federal courts.4
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1937, University of Illinois; J.D.
1940, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
IFor previous corporation law surveys, see Ham, Kentucky Law Sur-
vey- Corporations, 64 Ky. L.J. 253 (1975); Ham, Kentucky Law Sur-
vey-Corporations, 63 Ky. L.J. 739 (1975).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
The full text of the Rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
SEC Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
The full text of the section reads:
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However, recent restrictive interpretations of the Rule by the
Supreme Court of the United States will likely result in some
slowing of this wave of cases in the future. Last year's Survey
dealt with one such decision by the Supreme Court in the Blue
Chip Stamps case,8 which approved the Birnbaum standing
requirement for plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 suits.7 Under this re-
quirement a plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities
to have standing to bring a Rule 10b-5 damage suit.' Strict
adherence to this requirement, which now seems assured by the
Blue Chip Stamps decision, will undoubtedly serve to narrow
somewhat the class of plaintiffs eligible to bring such suits. As
suggested in the previous Survey, it will probably have its most
noticeable effect on minority shareholders seeking to find a
basis under federal law for bringing private civil damage suits
based on allegations of corporate mismanagement.'
During the past year, the Supreme Court further restricted
the scope of Rule 10b-5 by its decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 10 which established a scienter requirement for the
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors.
5 The current restrictive attitude of the Court toward the scope and application
of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 stands in marked contrast to the more expansive attitude
taken by the Court in the Bankers Life case, decided in 1971, in which Mr. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, had remarked that "Section 10(b) must be read flexi-
bly, not technically and restrictively." Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
£ Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
See Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 64 Ky. L.J. 253, 253-57 (1975).
The Birnbaum standing requirement was first enunciated in Birnbaum v. New-
port Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), from which
the requirement takes its name.
See Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 64 Ky. L.J. 253, 257 (1975). The
availability of the shareholder's derivative suit may mitigate this difficulty to some
extent in those cases where the minority shareholder can show the corporation has been
wronged as the result of a fraudulent securities transaction. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
10 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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maintenance of damage suits under the Rule. In reaching this
result the Court put at rest a conflict which had existed for
many years in the lower federal courts as to whether some form
of knowing or intentional conduct was required for liability
under Rule 10b-5 or whether negligent conduct was sufficient.
One of the early cases focusing attention on the scienter-
negligence issue was the decision of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in the well-known Texas Gulf Sulphur case," in
which Judge Waterman, speaking for a majority of the court,
held that in a suit for injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5 negli-
gent conduct would be sufficient to sustain such relief. 2 In this
same opinion he left the strong inference that he would have
considered a similar standard appropriate even in private dam-
age actions.13 However, other judges who heard the case ex-
pressed strong reservations as to imposing civil liability based
on mere negligent conduct,14 and the matter of civil liability
based on negligence remained an open question in the Second
Circuit for some time. " The issue was finally resolved for that
," SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
12 401 F.2d at 855.
13 Id.
"4 See, e.g., the concurring opinion of Judge Friendly, who expressed particular
concern as to the impact a damage award could have on a corporation based on
negligence in the drafting of a press release. He remarked: "The consequences of
holding that negligence in the drafting of a press release. . . may impose civil liability
on the corporation are frightening." Id. at 866. The open-ended nature of the damages
in such cases, due to the potentially large class of affected investors, was underscored
by Professor David Ruder in Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round, 63 Nw.
U.L. Rzv. 423, 428-29 (1969).
Is The tendency of judges to straddle the issue if at all possible was well illustrated
by the language of Judge Medina in the case of Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969), in which he responded as follows to charges
that officials of a corporation had caused it to publish misleading statements as to its
net income:
[W]e must now deal with the question of the standard by which the
conduct of the defendants is to be judged. Judge Waterman in the Texas
Gulf Sulphur opinion held that proof of negligence was sufficient to sustain
an action for injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5(2), but at the same time
found it not necessary to decide whether negligence absent a showing of bad
faith would suffice in a private suit for damages. . . .However, no question
of liability for damages was before the Court in Texas Gulf Sulphur and
Judge Friendly, in a concurring opinion joined in part by other judges, inti-
mated that the appropriate standard in a private damage action should
embody a scienter requirement.
1976]
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circuit in favor of a scienter requirement when the Court of
Appeals stated unequivocally that "proof of a willful or reckless
disregard for the truth is necessary to establish liability under
Rule 10b-5."'6
At the same time that the Second Circuit was resolving the
scienter-negligence issue in favor of a scienter requirement,
other federal circuits were expressing approval of a lesser stan-
dard,'7 although it appears that the conduct actually involved
in the cases in those circuits was knowing or intentional rather
than merely negligent. 8 Amid this growing confusion and con-
flict over the scienter-negligence issue, the Ninth Circuit Court
There is no occasion for us to enter this thicket now as we pass only upon
the legal sufficiency of the complaints to allege a claim for relief. This each
of the complaints fairly does. The charge that defendants "knew or should
have known" adequately alleges actual knowledge of the falsity of the
statements, and, alternatively, negligence or lack of diligence in failing to
ascertain the true facts. If some form of scienter test is to be applied, as
Judge Friendly seems to suggest in his concurring opinion in Texas Gulf
Sulphur, we think the alternative allegation of actual knowledge of falsity is
amply sufficient as a matter of pleading. And this would seem to be so
whether the scienter test ultimately applied be strict or liberal.
Id. at 913-14.
11 Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973). The decision of the
court, en banc, was 6-4. The case involved the liability of an outside director of a
corporation who had failed to uncover fraudulent misrepresentations made by inside
officials of the corporation to prospective purchasers of the corporation's stock. Judge
Hays, who wrote a separate dissenting opinion, would have applied a negligence stan-
dard in determining the director's liability. Id. at 1319. Judge Timbers, who also wrote
a separate dissenting opinion, while stating that he did not necessarily disagree with
Judge Hays' views on the scienter-negligence issue, treated the director's conduct as
involving "reckless disregard for the truth" within the standard adopted by the major-
ity. Id. at 1321-22.
11 See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963).
Is See Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972). Furthermore,
later decisions in some of these circuits indicated a move in the direction of a more
strict scienter standard. For example, in the Tenth Circuit, which had previously
indicated approval of a "due care" standard, the Court of Appeals in Clegg v. Conk,
50.7 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) spoke of the need for
"something additional by way of scienter or conscious fault than mere negli-
gence. . . ... Id. at 1361. And the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the
Lanza standard of "willful or reckless" conduct in an SEC suit for injunctive relief,
even though it had generally been assumed that the test of culpability was less strin-
gent in such suits than in private damage actions. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314
(6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
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of Appeals offered a new approach to solving the problem.' 9
Recognizing that much of the difficulty may have stemmed
from attempting to apply one standard for state of mind to all
Rule 10b-5 cases, a difficulty already recognized by legal com-
mentators, 20 the court rejected scienter or state of mind as a
necessary or separate element in a Rule 10b-5 action and
adopted a "flexible duty" standard based on the "extent of the
duty that Rule 10b-5 imposes on [the] particular defen-
dant." 21 The court said that in determining whether the defen-
dant's duty should be to exercise due care or only not to act
intentionally should depend upon all the circumstances of the
case including the relative positions of the plaintiff and defen-
dant.22 Although the "flexible duty" approach appeared to
" White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
One commentator, quoted by the court, expressed this viewpoint as follows:
Instead of perpetuating the practice of discussing scienter and negligence as
absolutes which are capable of being objectively applied, more is gained by
recognizing that there is a sliding scale which determines what constitutes
sufficiently diligent conduct to avoid 10b-5 liability, and that 10b-5 liability
is determinable only within the context of the vagaries of the specific facts
presented.
495 F.2d at 734, quoting Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to
Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206, 1209
(1970). Professor Alan Bromberg, in his treatise on Rule 10b-5, has also expressed
reservations as to whether a single standard of scienter can be made "to fit the enor-
mous variability of 10b-5 private suits." A. BROMBERG, 2 SEcumTrEs LAW: FRAUD, SEC
RULE 10b-5 § 8.4 at 513 (1971).
21 495 F.2d at 734-35.
2 In elaborating on this approach the court said:
[W]e feel the court should, in instructing on a defendant's duty under
rule 10b-5, require the jury to consider the relationship of the defendant to
the plaintiff, the defendant's access to the information as compared to the
plaintiff's access, the benefit that the defendant derives from the relation-
ship, the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon
their relationship in making his investment decisions and the defendant's
activity in initiating the securities transaction in question.
* ' * Where the defendant derives great benefit from a relationship of
extreme trust and confidence with the plaintiff, the defendant knowing that
plaintiff completely relies upon him for information to which he has ready
access, but to which plaintiff has no access, the law imposes a duty upon the
defendant to use extreme care in assuring that all material information is
accurate and disclosed. . .. On the other hand, where the defendant's rela-
tionship with the plaintiff is so casual that a reasonably prudent person
would not rely upon it in making investment decisions, the defendant's only
duty is not to misrepresent intentionally material facts.
Id. at 735-36.
1976]
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have considerable potential for resolving the "scienter" issue
under Rule 10b-5,23 further use of that approach now seems
foreclosed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Hochfelder.
The suit in Hochfelder was brought by customers of a
small Chicago brokerage firm against the accounting firm of
Ernst & Ernst to recover damages suffered by the customers as
the result of a fraudulent securities scheme in which the presi-
dent and owner of the brokerage firm converted the customers'
funds to his own use. 24 The charge against Ernst & Ernst was
that the accounting firm had "aided and abetted" the fraudu-
lent scheme by failing to utilize "appropriate audit proce-
dures" in auditing the books of the brokerage firm.5 It was
claimed that a proper audit of the internal practices of the
brokerage firm would have led to the discovery of the fraudu-
lent scheme. 6 There was no claim, however, that Ernst & Ernst
had engaged in any fraudulent or intentional misconduct.2
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that negligent conduct could form the basis for a damage suit
against a person for aiding and abetting a third party's viola-
tion of Rule 10b-5.2 The Supreme Court reversed, taking the
'3See Campbell, Elements of Recovery under Rule lob-5: Scienter, Reliance, and
Plaintiffl Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 So. CAR. L. REv. 653, 702-03 (1975).
However, Professor Louis Loss, author of the highly regarded treatise on Securities
Regulation, was not so charitable. In his Summary Remarks at an ABA National
Institute, he remarked as to the Abrams case: "... I must confess that I don't under-
stand how that opinion could possibly work. How is a judge possibly to charge a jury
under the sliding scale test?. . . It is a perfectly logical, beautiful view, except, I think,
that it is utterly impractical." Proceedings, ABA National Institute, Advisors to Man-
agement-Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants, 30 Bus. LAw.
165-66 (Special issue, March 1975).
24 The president had represented to the customers that their funds would be
invested in "escrow" accounts designed to yield a high rate of return. However, the
"escrow" accounts were never in fact created, the money invested being immediately
converted by the president to his own use. 425 U.S. at 189.
2 Id.
21 The principal practice pointed to in this respect was a "mail rule" employed
by the president of the brokerage firm whereby no mail addressed to him or to his
attention was to be opened except by him. It was contended that a proper audit by
Ernst & Ernst would have revealed the "mail rule," that its existence would then have
been disclosed to the Midwest Stock Exchange, of which the brokerage firm was a
member, as well as to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and that these disclo-
sures would have led to an investigation of the president which would have led to
discovery of the fraudulent scheme. Id. at 190.
27 Id.
2 Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 65
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position that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
under which Rule 10b-5 was promulgated,"9 requires proof of
more than negligent nonfeasance as a precondition to the impo-
sition of civil liability." The position of the Court was that a
private action for damages would not lie under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 "in the absence of any allegation of 'scienter'-
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 31 In reaching
this result the Court emphasized the legislative history of
§ 10(b), which the Court thought indicated a Congressional
intent to deal with practices involving "some element of
scienter, '3 and the language of § 10(b), which refers to the use
of "manipulative or deceptive" devices or contrivances.3 To
the Court this language was a persuasive indication that §
10(b) was intended to proscribe "knowing or intentional mis-
conduct.
'34
Although the position of the Court that "scienter" is a
necessary prerequisite for the imposition of bivil liability under
Rule 10b-5 was taken in the context of a case involving second-
ary liability through aiding and abetting, 5 the reasoning of the
See note 4 supra.
425 U.S. at 214.
, Id. at 193. The Court excluded from consideration whether reckless behavior
might be sufficient in some circumstances for the imposition of civil liability under §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for
injunctive relief under the section and rule. Id. at 193 n.12. Of interest in this latter
regard is a recent opinion by Judge Ward of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, in which he held that the reasoning of the Court in
Hochfelder was as equally applicable to injunctive suits brought by the SEC under §
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as to private damage actions. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
[Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,722 (S.D.N.Y. September 16, 1976).
On the other hand, still more recently the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
a showing of intent to deceive is not necessary in a suit by the SEC for injunctive relief,
despite the availability of good faith as a defense to a private suit for damages under
the Hoch/elder decision. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,751 (1st Cir. 1976).
32 425 U.S. at 201.
31 See note 4, supra.
11 425 U.S. at 197. The decision was 6-2, with Mr. Justice Powell writing for the
majority of the Court. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by Mr.
Justice Brennan, chastised the majority for interpreting § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
"restrictively and narrowly," thereby ignoring the interests of defrauded investors,
who, as he viewed it, could be "victimized just as much by negligent conduct as by
positive deception." Id. at 216. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration
of the case.
1' Because of its holding that intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud was re-
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Court would appear to be equally applicable to suits involving
primary parties. Accordingly, it can be assumed that another
broad group of cases, those based on allegations of negligent
misconduct, has been removed from the reach of Rule 10b-5.11
B. The Proxy Rules
Another recent Supreme Court decision carrying signifi-
cant implications for federal corporation law was TSC Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,37 involving the concept of materi-
ality under Rule 14a-9 of the federal proxy rules." Rule 14a-9,
which is an antifraud rule similar to Rule 10b-5, was promul-
gated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under au-
thority granted to it by § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.11 Rule 14a-9 prohibits false or misleading statements
or omissions of material facts in proxy statements required to
be submitted to shareholders of a corporation when their vote
is needed on corporate matters."
quired to create civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and the lack of any such
charges against Ernst & Ernst, the Court concluded that it did not need to consider
whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the
rule, nor the elements necessary to establish such a cause of action. Id. at 191-92 n.7.
For a general discussion of secondary liability under the securities laws, see Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy,
In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 597 (1972).
3S For a law review comment on the Supreme Court decision in the Hochfelder
case, see Note, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 775 (1976).
" 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1976).
3' 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). The full text of the section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a na-
tional securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit
the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect
of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to
Section 781 [§ 12] of this title.
The securities required to be registered under § 12 include shares of companies
whose stock is listed for trading on a national securities exchange and shares of compa-
nies whose stock is traded over-the-counter if they have assets in excess of $1,000,000
and a class of stock (equity security) held of record by 500 or more persons. 15 U.S.C.
§ 781 (1970).
" Rule 14a-9(a) contains the following language:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
Prior to the TSC Industries case, the lower federal courts
had been in some disagreement as to the proper test to use in
establishing the requisite materiality of a fact within the mean-
ing of Rule 14a-9. The Second, 41 Third, 4- and Fifth43 Circuits
had adopted as the basic test for materiality whether a reason-
able man would attach importance to the facts misrepresented
in determining his course of action. In contrast, the Seventh
Circuit 4 had considered that the policies which underlie §
14(a) and Rule 14a-9 would be best served by a test that in-
cluded "all facts which a reasonable shareholder might con-
sider important.
'45
The confusion as to the proper test for materiality had
been compounded by the Supreme Court itself as a result of
expressions regarding materiality contained in two earlier opin-
ions, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.4 and Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States.4 7 These two cases had dealt with the
necessity of proof of causation or actual reliance as prerequi-
sites to liability under Rule 14a-9 and Rule 10b-5.41 In Mills,
which arose under Rule 14a-9, the Court held that if a misstate-
ment or omission in a proxy statement was found to be
"material," there was no need for additional proof of actual
reliance." Similarly, in Affiliated Ute Citizens, involving Rule
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in light of
the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in
order to make the statements therein not false or misleading ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1976).
" Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1973).
2 Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 95,512, at 99,591 (3d Cir. April 8, 1976).
0 Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603-04 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974).
" Northway, Inc. v. TSC Industries, Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975).
' Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
396 U.S. 375 (1970).
' 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
" In List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811,
reh. denied, 382 U.S. 933 (1965), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained, in a
Rule 10b-5 case, that the purpose of the "reliance" requirement as an essential element
for recovery "is to certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plain-
tiff's injury." 340 F.2d at 462.
" The Court said:
Where there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a
sufficient showing of causal relationship between the violation and the injury
1976]
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10b-5, the Court held that positive proof of reliance, at least in
cases of nondisclosure, was not a prerequisite to recovery under
Rule 10b-5 if the facts withheld were otherwise "material." 50 In
Mills the Court spoke of an omitted fact as "material" if it was
of such a character that it might affect the judgment of the
reasonable investor,51 but then referred to the requirement that
the defect have "a significant propensity to affect the voting
process. ' 52 In Affiliated Ute Citizens, the Court spoke of with-
held facts being material "in the sense that a reasonable inves-
tor might have considered them important in the making" of
his investment decision.53 Thus the Supreme Court in TSC
Industries had an opportunity to clarify these expressions as to
materiality.
In TSC Industries, National Industries, Inc. acquired a
substantial stock interest in TSC Industries, after which it se-
cured the approval of the board of directors of TSC for a sale
of TSC's assets to National. The proposed sale of assets was
approved by the shareholders of both companies and the
merger of the two corporations was effected. Northway, Inc., a
TSC shareholder, brought a civil damage suit claiming that the
joint proxy statement sent to the shareholders of TSC seeking
their approval of the asset sale was materially misleading in
omitting certain information concerning the degree of control
National possessed over TSC and in the favorability of the
terms of the proposed transaction to TSC shareholders.54 The
for which he seeks redress if. . . he proves that the proxy solicitation itself,
rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essen-
tial link in the accomplishment of the transaction.
396 U.S. at 385.
0 The Court remarked:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to dis-
close, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is
necessary is that the facts withheld be material. . . . This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite ele-
ment of causation in fact.
406 U.S. at 153-54.
1, 396 U.S. at 384.
52 Id.
" 406 U.S. at 153-54.
An additional claim was made under Proxy Rule 14a-3 that the proxy statement
failed to state, as required by that Rule, that the stock acquisition by National had
given it control of TSC. 426 U.S. at 442. The Supreme Court accepted the conclusion
of the District Court and the Court of Appeals that a genuine issue of fact existed as
[Vol. 65
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying its test of
materiality which emphasized facts which a reasonable share-
holder might consider important,5 held that the alleged omis-
sions in the proxy statement were material as a matter of law.5
The Supreme Court reversed, treating the omissions as raising
issues of fact under the proper test of materiality, which the
Court considered to be whether, in regard to an omitted fact,
"there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote. ' ' 5 The
Court considered this test to comport best with the broad reme-
dial purpose of Rule 14a-9 to ensure disclosures on the part of
corporate management that would enable shareholders "to
make an informed choice."58 The Court cautioned that adopt-
ing too low a standard of materiality would not only subject a
corporation and its management to liability for insignificant
omissions or misstatements but would also lead to the possibil-
ity of shareholders being overwhelmed by an avalanche of triv-
ial information .5 The Court added that any language in the
Mills or Affiliated Ute Citizens cases suggesting a standard
based on information the shareholder might consider impor-
tant should not be considered controlling since the issue of
materiality was not the issue before the Court in those cases."0
to whether National had secured control of TSC and held that there was accordingly
no duty on the part of National or TSC to include in the proxy statement an unequivo-
cal statement that control had passed to National. Id. at 453.
512 F.2d at 330.
" 426 U.S. at 443.
426 U.S. at 449. In adopting this test of materiality, the Court said:
It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the
omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote.
What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood
that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed
actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.
Id.
Id. at 448.
,Id. at 448-49.
" Referring to Mills the Court pointed out that the reference to the omitted
information having a significant propensity to affect the voting process was added to
the general statement that the information be of a kind that might affect the voting
judgment of the reasonable shareholder to avoid the danger, as stated in Mills, that a
cause of action could be based on trivial defects having no relation to the interests
sought to be served by § 14(a). Id. at 447.
As to the reference in Affiliated Ute Citizens to the facts withheld being material
in the sense that a reasonable investor might be influenced by them, the Court said
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The decision of the Supreme Court in the TSC Industries
case choosing the higher threshold of materiality for Rule 14a-
9 cases is in line with the recent restrictive interpretations of
the Court under the Securities Acts. If a similar attitude to-
ward materiality can be expected on the part of the Court in
Rule 10b-5 cases, as seems likely, another step will have been
taken by the Court to reduce the volume of potential litigation
under these Acts.'
C. Insider Trading
A third Supreme Court case of importance in the corporate
securities area was Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Se-
curities Co.,62 which put at rest a sharp conflict among the
federal circuits as to the scope of short-swing trading liability
under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3 Section
16(b) provides that a corporation may recover any profits real-
ized by a director, officer, or 10 percent benficial owner of the
corporation's stock, from a purchase and sale, or sale and pur-
that since the issue of causation was before the Court in that case rather than the issue
of materiality it "was not necessary to articulate a precise definition of materiality but
only to give a 'sense' of the notion." Id. at 447 n.9.
" The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the Gerstle case stressed as an addi-
tional reason for adopting a test of materiality based on "probability" rather than
"possibility," the heavy damages that could result in view of its position that negligent
conduct was sufficient to warrant recovdry under Rule 14a-9. Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court specifically
refrained from considering in the TSC Industries case "what showing of culpability is
required to establish the liability under § 14(a) of a corporation issuing a materially
misleading proxy statement, or of a person involved in the preparation of a materially
misleading proxy statement." 426 U.S. at 444-45 n.7. As the Court of Appeals pointed
out in Gerstle, the considerations for establishing a standard of culpability under Rule
14a-9 may be different from those for establishing such a standard under Rule 10b-5,
particularly in view of the absence in § 14(a) of the evil sounding language of
"manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" contained in § 10(b). 478 F.2d at
1298-1301. The Supreme Court also seemed to recognize this possible difference in its
opinion in the Hochfelder case. 425 U.S. at 209 n.28.
62 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
1 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). The trading prohibitions of § 16(b) apply only to
corporate "insiders," defined in § 16(a) as including "[e]very person who is directly
or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity
security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 781
[§ 12] of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security
. " 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970). The term "equity security" is broadly defined in
the Exchange Act as including any stock of a corporation or any security convertible
into stock of the corporation. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1970).
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
chase, of the corporation's stock within a period of 6 months- 4
The section exempts any transaction where the beneficial
owner was not such both "at the time of" the purchase and
sale, or the sale and purchase, of the stock. 5 The question
which had given rise to difference of opinion was whether the
purchase which made a person a 10 percent owner could be
counted in establishing his status as a beneficial owner "at the
time of purchase."6 In other words, there was disagreement as
to whether for a person to be a 10 percent owner "at the time
of purchase" he must have acquired such status "before the
purchase" or whether it was enough that he possessed such
status "immediately after the purchase."67
One of the first cases involving this question arose in the
Second Circuit where the Court of Appeals upheld the position
of the District Court that the purchase which makes a person
a 10 percent owner may itself be counted in determining 10
percent beneficial ownership under § 16(b).11 The District
" The relevant language of § 16(b) reads:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer
(other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months,
unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt
previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, ir-
respective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or
officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or
of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit
to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the
issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse
to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to
prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than
two years after the date such profit was realized. ...
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
" The last sentence of § 16(b) reads, in part:
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such
beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or
the sale and purchase, of the security involved . . ..
Id.
" 423 U.S. at 235.
7 Id. at 240. The reference to "immediately after the purchase" is sometimes
spoken of as "simultaneously with the purchase." Id.
61 Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 831 (1956).
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Court had felt such a position was required since otherwise it
would be possible for a person to escape liability in a sale-
repurchase sequence where after making an initial purchase of
stock which put him in the 10 percent class he sold out his
interests and then repurchased them." Later, the Eighth Cir-
cuit agreed with the Second Circuit position. 0 However, when
the issue came before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the
Provident Securities case, 71 that court held to the contrary,
taking the position that the initial purchase by which a person
increases his holdings to 10 percent should not be counted in
determining § 16(b) liability.72 The court saw no inconsistency
in taking the "before the sale" approach in the purchase-sale
sequence while at the same time using an "immediately after
the purchase" approach in a sale-repurchase sequence to meet
the potential for abuse in the latter situation.
73
On review of the Provident Securities case, the Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals and agreed
that "in a purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner must
account for profits only if he was a beneficial owner 'before the
purchase."'74 However, the Supreme Court refused to express
an opinion on the view taken by the Court of Appeals that the
phrase "at the time of' as used in the exemption clause of §
16(b) could mean different things in different contexts.75
11 Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The
court remarked that if the "before the purchase" construction were placed upon the
exemption clause "it would be possible for a person to purchase a large block of stock,
sell it out until his ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then repeat the process
ad infinitum." Id. at 959.
70 Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd
on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972). The central issue before the Supreme Court in
Emerson Electric involved whether in a two-step sale by a 10 percent beneficial owner
the second sale comes under § 16(b) if as a result of the first sale the beneficial owner
reduced his ownership below 10 percent. The Court held that the second sale fell
outside the scope of the section so long as the two sales were not legally tied to each
other.
1, Provident Securities Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.
1974).
72 Id. at 614.
13 Id. at 614-15.
7, 423 U.S. at 249, 250.
,s Id. at 242 n.15. The Court remarked: "The view of the Court of Appeals that
'at the time' may mean different things in different contexts is not unique.. .. We
express no opinion here on this view." Id.
[Vol. 65
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While the Provident Securities case awaited review by the
Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit
in adopting the "before the purchase" position as to liability
under § 16(b).76 The Court of Appeals looked to the legislative
history of the section and reasoned that it showed that the aim
of Congress in enacting the section was to deal with a unitary
event involving "a specific type of two-part transaction consist-
ing either of a purchase and subsequent sale, or a sale and
subsequent repurchase," and was not aimed at "every separate
purchase or sale as to which some use of inside information is
a theoretical possibility."77 The court further reasoned that,
under such an interpretation of § 16(b), a beneficial interest at
the close of a short-swing transaction becomes irrelevant, and
thus avoids the necessity of giving a dual meaning to the words
"at the time of" in the exemption clause as was done by the
Ninth Circuit in Provident Securities to meet the sale-
repurchase transaction.78 The court did not consider that the
language of the exemption clause changed the basic meaning
of the section. They read the clause as simply confirming the
requirement that a beneficial owner must have insider status
at the beginning of a short-swing transaction.71
7' Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
7 Id. at 346.
79 Id.
11 Id. at 348. The court commented that an ambiguity was created by the use of
the word "both" in the exemption clause. The court reasoned that it was possible to
read the word "both" to refer to the separate components of the two types of short-
swing transactions, or it was possible to read the word to refer to the two types of
transactions as transactions. Neither construction, thought the court, was absolutely
apparent. The court said:
If Congress had intended the first construction it could easily have said
"both at the time of the purchase and at the time of the sale." Similarly, if
Congress had intended the second construction it could have said "both at
the time of the purchase and sale transaction or the sale and purchase trans-
action." . . . Given the legislative history of section 16(b) .. .we believe
Congress intended by the language in question merely to indicate that in the
case of both types of short-swing transactions, a person, to be charged with
a section 16(b) violation, must only have had insider status prior to the
initial purchase or sale.
Id.
A side effect of the reasoning in the Allis-Chalmers case is to put in doubt the
position of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Adler v. Klawans,-267 F.2d 840 (2d
Cir. 1959), that an officer or director who makes an initial purchase before obtaining
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The Supreme Court noted the approach to the exemption
clause taken by the Seventh Circuit but did not consider the
occasion called for an assessment of that approach."0 The
Court, confining itself to a consideration of the exemption
clause itself, treated the legislative history of that clause as
indicating an intent on the part of Congress "to preserve the
requirement of beneficial ownership before the purchase" in a
purchase-sale sequence.8 ' Therefore, the decision may have
only limited value in settling the scope of liability under §
16(b) in other contexts. The decision is, however, consistent
with other recent interpretations of § 16(b) by the Court limit-
ing the potential scope of liability under the section."
II. STATE CORPORATION LAW
A. Securities Regulation
The only significant Kentucky case directly concerned
with corporation law during the past Survey year was City of
Owensboro v. First U.S. Corp., 3 which dealt with the proper
statute of limitations to apply to a securities fraud claim
such status should be considered an insider for § 16(b) purposes. Under the reasoning
of Allis-Chalmers, for insiders to come within the reach of § 16(b) they must have
become insiders before their initial transaction.
10 423 U.S. at 243 n.16. Likewise, the Court refrained from expressing any view
"on the proper analysis of a case where a director or officer makes an initial transaction
before obtaining insider status." Id.
I1 d. at 248. Noting the strict nature of the liability imposed by § 16(b), a virtual
liability without fault, the Court used, as an added justification for its position, the
assumption that if Congress had intended to impose such a liability, it would have
done so "expressly or by unmistakeable inference." Id. at 252. The Court also seemed
to take comfort in the presence of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as a viable source of recovery
for those investors harmed as the result of an actual misuse of material inside informa-
tion. Id. at 255.
81 See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582
(1973); Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
0 534 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1975). Two lower federal court cases arising in Kentucky
involving interpretation and application of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws were Brown v. Commonwealth, 513 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1976) (eleventh amendment of United States Constitution pro-
tects state from being sued by one of its citizens for damages alleged to have resulted
from violations of antifraud provisions of federal securities laws), and SEC v. Senex
Corp., 399 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ky.), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1240 (1975) (knowledgeable assis-
tance in suppressing unfavorable circumstances surrounding nursing home project
constitutes sufficient violation of Rule lob-5 under the aider-abettor doctrine to war-
rant injunctive relief).
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brought under the Kentucky Securities Act (Blue Sky Law).8 4
The City of Owensboro case involved a suit by the city of
Owensboro against First U. S. Corporation charging that First
U. S. Corporation had sold certain bonds to the city on the
basis of fraudulent misrepresentations. The suit was brought
under the civil remedies section of the Kentucky Securities
Act," which prohibits the sale of securities by means of mis-
representations or omissions of material fact unknown to the
buyer of the securities." The section permits the seller to de-
fend such a suit by sustaining the burden of showing that he
did not know or in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known of the misrepresentations or omissions. The Act
limits the time for bringing such suits to a period of 2 years
from the date of sale.88 The city of Owensboro did not bring suit
within the 2 years thus prescribed by the Securities Act."
However, the action was brought within the 5 year period al-
lowed under the general statute of limitations in Kentucky for
actions based on fraud.
0
The Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld the decision of
the trial judge in dismissing the case under the 2 year statute. 1
' Ky. Rv. STAT. ch. 292 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
m KRS § 292.480(1).
" The relevant portion of the section reads:
Any person, who . . . offers or sells a security by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the
untruth or omission) and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he
did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of
the untruth or omission, is liable to the person buying the security from him
Id.
" Id.
A KRS § 292.480(3), amended to 3 years, KRS § 292.480(3) (Supp. 1976).
" When an amended complaint was filed, adding additional defendants, it was
argued that even though this amended complaint was filed more than 5 years after the
date of sale, the wrongful conduct of the additional defendants was not discovered by
the plaintiffs until less than 5 years before the amended complaint was filed. 534
S.W.2d at 790.
30 The time period for bringing actions based on fraud under the Kentucky general
statute of limitations is 5 years. KRS § 413.120(12). The time does not begin to run
until after discovery of the fraud. KRS § 413.130(3). However, the action must be
commenced within 10 years after the commission of the fraud. Id.
"1 534 S.W.2d at 790.
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The Court relied on its earlier decision in First State Bank of
Pineville v. Slusher,92 in which the Court had approved its
previous position that the presence of a specific limitations
period in a Blue Sky Law evidenced a legislative design to,
make that the governing period.93 This appears to be the gen-
eral rule.94
The city of Owensboro made the further argument that its
claim could be supported as a federal claim under § 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933,15 which likewise proscribes fraud in
the sale of securities,96 since that section contains no limita-
tions period for actions brought under it," and therefore the
92 101 S.W.2d 661 (Ky. 1937).
93 534 S.W.2d at 791. The Court in Slusher considered the statute of limitations
issue to have been settled in Thomas v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 80 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. 1935),
in which the Court had applied the 2 year limitation period to a case involving charges
of fraudulent conduct on the part of a dealer in securities in the sale of corporate stock.
"1 See 3 L. Loss, SECURMEs REGULATION 1640 (2d ed. 1961). The author there
states: "When there is a special statute of limitations in the blue sky law, it prevails,
of course, over a general statute of limitations which might otherwise be applicable."
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1971).
" The full text of the section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of
a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id.
There is an obvious similarity in the language of § 17(a) and Rule 10b-5. See note
3, supra. This results from the fact that § 17(a) was used as the source for the drafting
of Rule lOb-5. As explained by Judge Friendly in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case:
The derivation of Rule 10b-5 is peculiar. Although the authority for the Rule
comes from § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the drafts-
men turned their backs on the language of that section and borrowed the
words of § 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, simply broadening these to
include frauds on the seller as well as the buyer.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968).
11 Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, like § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, contains no express
civil liability provisions, but as Judge Friendly remarked in the Texas Gulf Sulphur
case, supra note 96, at 867: "Once it had been established, however, that an aggrieved
buyer has a private action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, there seemed little practical
point in denying the existence of such an action under § 17."
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Kentucky general statutes governing actions based on fraud (or
on a statute) should apply. 8 The Supreme Court of Kentucky
likewise rejected this argument, taking the position that the 2
year limitations period in the state Securities Act was the most
appropriate state statute to apply.99
The issue as to the proper statute of limitations to apply
to federal claims brought under the implied civil liability provi-
sions of the Federal Securities Acts' 0 has been litigated most
extensively in relation to Rule 10b-5.'0' The federal courts have
uniformly agreed that since there is no general federal statute
of limitations applicable to civil actions, local state statutes of
limitation should be applied.' 2 The selection of the appropriate
state limitations statute has been made by applying a
"resemblance" test to determine which state statute most
closely resembles the federal claim.'03 The result has been a
sharp division of opinion as to whether the blue sky or general
fraud statute of limitations applies.' 4 There is much to be said
for the position of the Kentucky Court in adopting the shorter
statute of limitations period contained in the Blue Sky Law,
since this appears to conform best to the federal policy of using
short limitations periods in the express civil liability provisions
of the Federal Securities Acts,' 5 as well as to the needs of the
534 S.W.2d at 791. The Kentucky general statute of limitations prescribes a 5
year limitations period for actions based on a statute where no other time is fixed by
the statute creating the liability. KRS § 413.120(2).
" 534 S.W.2d at 791. The only previous case which appears to have raised this
issue under Kentucky law was that of Dudley v. Allen, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,273 (W.D. Ky. October 28, 1971), in which the federal
district court applied the general fraud statute without discussion.
10 Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 grants exclusive jurisdiction
to the federal courts "of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty" created by the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). But under § 22(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, the federal courts are given only concurrent jurisdiction with
the state courts for violations of that Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970).
'M See Martin, Statutes of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions: Which State Statute is
Applicable?, 29 Bus. LAw. 443 (1974).
"1 14 W. FLETCHER, PuVATE CORPORATIONS § 6780.29 (perm. ed. 1975 rev. vol.).
'' Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DUKE L.J.
1125, 1144.
'- Compare Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 852 (1970)(limitations period in state Blue Sky Law applied) with Douglass v.
Glenn E. Hinton Invs. Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971) (state general limitations
statute based on fraud applied).
," The usual period under these acts for actions based on misstatements and
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corporate world in removing clouds on the sales of securities as
expeditiously as possible."6
B. Preemptive Rights
While there were no significant decisions from the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky during the past Survey year in the
traditional areas of corporation law,' °7 there was a noteworthy
decision by the Supreme Court of Oregon in McCollum v.
Gray.'10 That case involved the right of a controlling share-
holder in a close corporation to amend the articles of incorpora-
tion to eliminate the preemptive right of the minority share-
holder.
The preemptive right concerns the right of existing share-
holders in a corporation to purchase their proportionate share
of any new issues of stock.0 9 It has been spoken of as "an
inherent, preemptive, and vested right of property." ' Despite
omissions in the sale of securities or in documents filed with the Commission is 1 year
from discovery of the misstatements or omissions or 3 years from the date of sale or
filing. See, e.g., § 13 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970)(misstatements or omis-
sions in sale of a security); § 18 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970)(misleading
statements in filed reports).
,o See Martin, supra note 101, at 454-57. On the other hand, there is some indica-
tion that as a result of the Hochfelder decision, with its emphasis on the presence of
scienter in Rule 10b-5 actions, courts will turn to those state limitations statutes
applicable to actions requiring proof of such element. See Dirksen v. Hynes & Howes
Ins. Counselors, Inc., BNA SEC. REG. & LAW REP., No. 383, Dec. 22, 1976, at A-7 (S.D.
Iowa 1976). This, of course, could lead to use of the normally longer fraud statute of
limitations period.
I" Other Kentucky cases involving corporations include: The Bank Josephine v.
C. & J. Quality Elkhorn Coal Co., No. 73-852 (Ky. Feb. 6, 1976)(money advanced by
bank to president and principal shareholder of a company in his individual capacity
cannot be treated as a corporate debt even though the money was signed over to the
corporation by the president where bank did not intend to hold company liable on the
debt); Phelps v. Sallee, 529 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. 1975)(order of Commissioner of the
Department of Banking and Securities approving articles of incorporation of proposed
bank becomes final once issued and cannot be later modified, changed, or set aside
where such power of modification is not specifically conferred by the statute creating
the agency); Commonwealth v. James Municipal Equip., Inc., 531 S.W.2d 517 (Ky.
1975)(indictment under statute prohibiting contributions to political organizations
governed by 2 year statute of limitations provided for violations of the election laws
where the penalty is less than confinement in the penitentiary rather than the 1 year
limitation statute applicable to misdemeanors generally).
"' 542 P.2d 1025 (Ore. 1975).
,0 11 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5135 (perm. ed. 1971 rev. vol.).
,o Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 146 N.Y.S. App. 115, 120, 78 N.E. 1090, 1094
(1906).
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
such unequivocal statements, the preemptive right has been
subject to a number of exceptions,' 1' and can be limited or
denied in the articles of incorporation under modern corpora-
tion statutes."2 In fact, some of the newer statutes, including
the present Delaware statute,"' deny the existence of the
preemptive right except to the extent that it is recognized and
provided for in the articles of incorporation." 4
In McCollum, the plaintiff, McCollum, along with the de-
fendant, Gray, and one Lee Evans, executed a preincorporation
agreement to form a corporation in which the three would own
an equal interest. After the corporation was formed, Evans sold
his interest to Gray, who proceeded to add new shareholders
through the issue of additional shares of stock, having first
amended the articles of incorporation and bylaws to eliminate
the preemptive rights of McCollum. McCollum brought a dam-
age suit contending that Gray's actions in amending the arti-
cles and bylaws to eliminate his preemptive rights constituted
a breach of the preincorporation agreement. McCollum argued
that he had "an implied contractual or vested right that the
articles and bylaws of the corporation would not be amended
and that his interest in the corporation would remain the same
as when he acquired his shares.""' 5 The Supreme Court of Ore-
gon rejected McCollum's argument, pointing to the provisions
of the Oregon Business Corporation Act which permit a corpo-
ration through a majority vote of its shareholders to amend its
articles of incorporation." ' The court took the position that the
' See 11 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORTONS § 5136 (perm. ed. 1971 rev. vol.).
The New York Court of Appeals recognized two of these exceptions in the Stokes case,
when it said: "We are thus led to lay down the rule that a stockholder has an inherent
right to a proportionate share of new stock issued for money only and not to purchase
property for the purposes of the corporation or to effect a consolidation .... " 146
N.Y.S. App. at 120-21, 78 N.E. at 1094-95.
112 See, e.g., KRS § 271A.130.
M, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(3) (1974).
' See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 26 (rev. ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL Acr]. However, the Model Act offers an alternative section which
preserves the preemptive right except as limited or denied by the articles of incorpora-
tion or the statute itself (such as in the case of shares issued for property) for use by
those states which prefer the more traditional statutory approach. MODEL ACT § 26A.
Kentucky chose the alternate section. See KRS § 271A.130.
", 542 P.2d at 1028.
' ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.360(1)(c) (1975). For a similar provision under the Ken-
tucky Business Corporation Act, see KRS § 271A.295(1)(c). The power to amend or
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general power of amendment thus possessed by the majority
could be so exercised absent a showing of "fraud or other
wrongful conduct.""' 7 Since Oregon, which adopted the Model
Business Corporation Act in 1953,111 and Kentucky, which
adopted the Act in 1972,119 are both Model Act jurisdictions, a
decision such as that rendered by the Supreme Court of Oregon
in the McCollum case as to the power of amendment of corpo-
rate charters carries significant implications for the exercise of
a similar power under the Kentucky Business Corporation
Act.
20
The principal argument which has been made in opposi-
tion to the exercise of the amending power has been the one
advanced in McCollum that its exercise affects vested rights.
The vested rights doctrine is of constitutional origin based on
the notion that a shareholder's rights become fixed at the time
he acquires his stock and cannot be altered without impairing
his contract rights121 or depriving him of his property without
just compensation, 12 unless it is with his consent. The impair-
ment of contracts21r argument has been effectively removed
repeal the bylaws is vested in the board of directors unless reserved to the shareholders
by the articles of incorporation under both the Oregon and Kentucky statutes. See
ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.141 (1975); KRS § 271A.135(1).
"1 542 P.2d at 1030. In addition to the general power of amendment both the
Oregon and Kentucky statutes specifically recognize the power of a corporation to
amend its articles of incorporation so as "to limit, deny or grant to shareholders of any
class the preemptive right to acquire additional or treasury shares of the corporation,
whether then or thereafter authorized." ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.355(2)(p) (1975); KRS §
271A.290(2)(p).
"' OREGON LAws ch. 549 (1953) (presently ORE. REv. STAT. ch. 57).
See Ham, Kentucky Adopts a New Business Corporation Act, 61 Ky. L.J. 73
(1972).
' See KRS § 271A.290.
121 See Wheatley v. A.I. Root Co., 69 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1946) (elimination of
accrued dividends on preferred stock).
In See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A.115 (Del. 1936)(elimination of accrued divi-
dends on preferred stock).
'2 The origins of the "impairment of contracts" argument can be traced to the
famous Dartmouth College case, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States
in 1819, in which it was held that a corporate charter constitutes a contract between
the corporation and the state and that it would constitute an impairment of the
obligation of contract if the state were to attempt to alter or repeal the charter without
having reserved the power to do so. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819). For a time there existed some question whether the reserved power
extended also to the relation of the corporation with its shareholders and to the rela-
tions of the shareholders between themselves. See generally Bove v. The Community
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through the inclusion of reserved power clauses in either state
constitutions2 4 or corporation statutes. 25 The due process argu-
ment has been generally considered to have been effectively
negated where the corporation statute specifically permits the
alteration of the right in question.' 26 This explains the presence
in the Model Act of a detailed clause spelling out specific areas
deemed subject to the amending power, including preemptive
rights,127 as a supplement to the clause providing for the general
power to amend the articles of incorporation.rs The aim of the
Model Act provisions was to remove the vested rights doctrine
as a viable argument for obstructing legitimate corporate
changes.' 29 However, this does not preclude the courts from
Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89, 96-98 (R.I. 1969). It now seems to be generally agreed that
the reserved power reaches all three aspects of the corporate charter and thus empow-
ers the legislature to amend corporation statutes so as to authorize corporate action
affecting shareholder rights. See 7 W. FLETCHER, PMVATE CORPORATIONS § 3695 at 883
(perm. ed. 1964).
24 See, e.g., Ky. CONST. § 3, which provides: "[E]very grant of a franchise,
privilege, or exemption, shall remain subject to revocation, alteration, or amendment."
125 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 394 (1974).
'M See Halloran, Equitable Limitations on the Power to Amend Articles of
Incorporation, 4 PAC. L.J. 47, 50 n.14 (1973). The author of this article states:
The apparent basis for this rationale is that a specific statute makes it clear
that the amendment is authorized by the shareholder's contract (which in-
cludes the statute), and therefore, the right cannot be vested because the
shareholder has consented in advance to the taking of his property.
Id.
" MODEL ACr § 58, second paragraph. See also KRS § 271A.290(2).
12 MODEL ACr § 58, first paragraph. This paragraph provides:
A corporation may amend its articles of incorporation, from time to time, in
any and as many respects as may be desired, so long as its articles of incorpo-
ration as amended contain only such provisions as might be lawfully con-
tained in original articles of incorporation at the time of making such amend-
ment, and, if a change in shares or the rights of shareholders, or an exchange,
reclassification or cancellation of shares or rights of shareholders is to be
made, such provisions as may be necessary to effect such change, exchange,
reclassification or cancellation.
See also KRS § 271A.290(1).
"' The Comment to § 58 of the Model Act states:
One of the major purposes of the Model Act was to sweep aside the
complexities of judicial decisions on vested rights which were increasingly
handicapping the conduct of business through the corporate form. Accord-
ingly the amendment power under section 58 is both general and spe-
cific. . . .The specific powers to amend relate to those matters which either
have been held in the past or, because of their importance, might otherwise
be held to be "vested rights.". . . The specification of matters that may be
amended necessarily takes them out of the category of "vested rights."
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exercising their equitable powers to prevent unjust action by
the majority. 3 ' Thus the decision of the Oregon court in
McCollum appears consistent with this approach.
C. Tender Offers
A recent legislative development involving the enactment
by Kentucky and other states of "takeover" laws regulating
tender offers is worthy of special comment since corporate ac-
quisitions through the tender offer route were largely unregu-
lated at either the state or federal level until recently.13' The
implications of this new legislation for a company planning a
corporate acquisition through the making of a tender offer to
the shareholders of a target company are therefore consider-
able.13
At the federal level, Congress sought to fill this gap in
securities regulation by enactment of the Williams Bill in
2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. 2d § 58 2 (1971).
Further support for this treatment of the preemptive right would seem to be
provided by the language of § 26A of the Model Act, which states: "The preemptive
right shall be only an opportunity to acquire shares or other securities under such terms
and conditions as the board of directors may fix for the purpose of providing a fair and
reasonable opportunity for the exercise of such right." See also KRS § 271A.130(2)(e).
"I For a discussion of equitable limitations on the power of amendment written
with specific reference to California law, see Halloran, Equitable Limitations on the
Power to Amend Articles of Incorporation, 4 PAC. L.J. 47 (1973).
" An acquisition minded company seeking to obtain control of another company
whose management is hostile to such a takeover has three alternative approaches it
may use to achieve its goal. It may make a cash tender offer to the shareholders of the
target company, it may make a public exchange offer to such shareholders offering to
exchange its stock for the stock of the target company, or it may initiate a proxy contest
to oust incumbent management. See Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender
Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.J. 269, 273 (1969). Since proxy contests have long been
subject to control as the result of the federal proxy rules and public exchange offers
are subject to the registration requirements for new security issues under the Securities
Act of 1933, the cash tender offer became a popular acquisition device due to its
freedom from regulation. Id. at 273-74.
"3 The prior freedom enjoyed by a company attempting an acquisition through
the route of the cash tender offer was underscored in the following comment made by
one of the speakers at a meeting of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association on the topic of "Take-over Bids" held in conjunc-
tion with the annual meeting of the American Bar Association in July 1971:
It could, and usually did, act without prior warning, could move behind the
screen of an agent bank or broker without disclosing its own identity, did not
have to disclose any of its future plans for the target company and could
accept or reject tenders and change the terms of its offer at will.
Take-Over Bids, 27 Bus. LAw. 243, 246 (1971)(remarks of Samuel C. Butler).
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1968,'1' which added several provisions to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.'11 They were designed to afford investors
protection in connection with tender offers similar to that
which they were receiving with other types of securities trans-
actions.'3 5 The Williams Act"' contains provisions empowering
the Securities and Exchange Commission to require persons or
groups acquiring more than 5 percent'37 of a corporation's stock
through a tender offer to reveal to the Commission, the corpo-
ration, and its security holders, at the time the tender offer is
made:
the-size of the holdings of the person or group involved, the
source of the funds used or to be used to acquire the shares,
any contracts or arrangements relating to the shares, and, if
the purpose of the acquisition is to acquire control of the
company, any plans to liquidate the company, sell its assets,
merge it with another company, or make major changes in its
business or corporate structure.'38
'11 S. 510, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REc. 21481 (1968).
'I The provisions directly concerned with tender offers are §§ 14(d), (e) and (f)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d), (e) and (f) (1970). Section
14(d) regulates the making of the tender offer, § 14(e) contains a general antifraud
provision similar to Rule 10b-5, and § 14(f) contains a disclosure requirement where a
tender offer results in a change in the majority of directors without shareholder action.
The Williams Act, as originally adopted, applied only to cash tender offers and not to
public exchange offers. The provision in the Act excluding the public exchange offer
was deleted by amendments to the Act adopted by Congress in 1970. Act of Dec. 22,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 4, 84 Stat. 1497.
" The Senate Committee Report which accompanied the Williams Bill stated:
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
provide protection for millions of investors by requiring full disclosure of
information in connection with the public offering or trading of securities.
These laws have worked well to provide the public with adequate informa-
tion on which to base intelligent investment decisions, thereby enhancing
public confidence in the Nation's securities markets and encouraging the
healthy growth and development of those markets.
There are, however, some areas still remaining where full disclosure is
necessary for investor protection but not required by present law. One such
area is the purchase of substantial or controlling blocks of the securities of
publicly held companies. S.510 would amend the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information and would afford
other protections to stockholders . . ..
S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1968).
' Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454.
' The original figure was 10 percent. This figure was reduced to 5 percent by the
1970 amendments to the Act. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 3, 84 Stat.
1497.
'13 S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1968). The detailed requirements are
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There are also provisions relating to withdrawal of securities
during a tender offer,139 to pro rata acceptance of shares where
an excess amount of shares are tendered,"' and to assurance of
a uniform tender offer price."' The Committee reports that
accompanied the Williams Bill made it clear that the purpose
of the new restrictions and limitations was not to encourage or
discourage tender offers generally but to afford increased pro-
tection to investors without favoring either side in a tender
offer contest.142
State legislation regulating tender offers made its appear-
ance at about the same time as the Williams Act but has not
displayed the same neutral approach.' The state laws contain
provisions for prepublication of tender offers and for the hold-
ing of administrative hearings. Outwardly aimed at providing
additional protection to local investors, these provisions have
the potential for strengthening the position of the management
of local companies in combating undesirable or unwanted take-
overs by outside interests.' The takeover law enacted by the
1976 Kentucky General Assembly reflects this local interest
approach.'
set out in § 14(d)(1) of the Act and SEC Rule 14d-1. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970). 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-1.
,3, § 14(d)(5). 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970).
14 § 14(d)(6). 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1970).
141 § 14(d)(7). 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1970).
42 The Senate Committee Report stated:
The committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regu-
lation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid. The bill is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the
benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and manage-
ment equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1968).
"I Two of the first state "takeover" statutes were enacted in Virginia and Ohio.
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 et seq. (1973); OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page
Supp. 1975). These and other state statutes are reviewed in Moylan, State Regulation
of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 687 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Moylan].
"I It has been said of the state laws:
The states enacting such legislation advance several rationales for assuming
authority over tender offers for companies incorporated in or based within
their respective boundaries. They. . . proclaim the need to afford investors
additional protections in this area. . . It is submitted, however, that this
type of state legislation is a reaction to the fear that such a bid will adversely
effect [sic] the local economy.
Moylan at 690.
"I KRS §§ 292.560 et seq. Two additional states enacting takeover statutes during
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The Kentucky Act requires a tender offeror to publicize
the terms of any proposed takeover bid at least 20 days prior
to the making of the tender offer and file copies of all informa-
tion required by the Act with the state Director of Securities
and the target company.' The information required is similar
to that prescribed by the Williams Act and includes data con-
cerning the business and financial position of the offeror,
source and amount of funds to be used in accomplishing the
proposed acquisition, particulars as to any contracts or ar-
rangements regarding shares of the target company, and bio-
graphical summaries of all directors and executive officers of
the offeror for the past 5 years."7 Within 10 days after the filing
of such information, the Director of Securities can order a hear-
ing, either upon his own initiative or upon request by the target
company, to determine whether the tender offeror proposes to
make a full and fair disclosure of all information material to
an investment decision by the shareholders of the target
company." 8 The hearing must be held within 40 days of the
information filing date and an adjudication must be made
within 60 days after the filing date.' A "take-over bid" applies
to tender offers made to 10 or more record holders of an equity
security of a corporation,'50 which if successful would result in
the offeror becoming the owner of more than 5 percent of any
class of the equity securities of the corporation.'5 ' The legisla-
1976 were Delaware and New York. See DEL. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 203, P-H CoRP. SERV.,
Del., 449-50-A (1976); N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw, Art. 16, §§ 1600 et seq. P-H CoRP. SERv.,
N.Y., 305-08. (1976).
"' KRS § 292.570(1).
,, KRS § 292.570(3).
U KRS § 292.570(1).
"' KRS § 292.580.
' The term "equity security" is defined by the Act to include:
any shares or similar securities, or any securities convertible into such securi-
ties, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such securi-
ties, or any such warrant or right, or any other security which, for the protec-
tion of security holders, is treated as an equity security pursuant to regula-
tions of the director of securities.
KRS § 292.560(5).
"I KRS § 292.560(1). A "take-over" bid, however, does not include bids made by
a dealer for his own account as a part of his business of buying and selling securities,
or an offer to acquire an equity security by a company in exchange for its own securities
(provided the exchange does not involve a public offering of securities under the Fed-
eral Securities Act of 1933), or any tender offer to which the board of directors of the
19761
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tion applies to tender offers made to security holders of corpo-
rations organized under Kentucky law or having their principal
place of business and substantial assets within the state. 5 ' An
offeror is prohibited from making a takeover bid which is not
made to all holders of the security involved residing in the state
or which is not made to such resident holders on the same
terms as to nonresident holders of the security."3 There are also
regulatory provisions pertaining to pro rata acceptance of
shares where more are tendered than called for by the tender
offer"4 and assuring the payment of a uniform price to all ten-
dering shareholders where the tender price is increased during
the life of the tender offer.
5
5
While the above regulatory features of the Kentucky take-
over statute pertaining to pro rata acceptance of shares and
payment of a uniform tender offer price are common to state
takeover statutes generally and complement similar provisions
in the Williams Act,"'5 other aspects of state takeover legisla-
tion may well raise some rather serious constitutional issues
when placed alongside the federal legislation. 57 One such issue
is preemption,"18 arising from the fact that the special interest
nature of the state legislation puts it in opposition to the neu-
tral philosophy of the federal legislation.' 5 Another results
target company consents if the board of directors has recommended acceptance of the
offer to the shareholders of the target company and the terms of the tender offer have
been furnished to the shareholders. Id.
,S2 KRS § 292.560(1).
" KRS § 292.590.
154 Id.
In KRS § 292.590. Certain exemptions from the provisions of the Act are recog-
nized pertaining to public utility holding companies, bank holding companies, savings
and loan holding companies, and insurance companies. KRS § 292.630.
15 See notes 140 and 141, supra.
,5 See the discussion of the constitutional issues in Moylan at 699-702.
'' Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides, in part:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State
over any security of any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provi-
sions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
, ' See Moylan at 699-700. A subcommittee of the American Bar Association, the
Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the Federal Regulation of
Securities Committee, has recommended that Congress take the necessary steps to
establish federal preemption over corporate takeovers. See BNA SEC. REG. & LAW REP.,
No. 370, Sept. 22, 1976, at A-5.
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from the extraterritorial nature of the state laws which open
them to the charge that they violate the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution' 0 by placing an undue burden on
interstate commerce.'"' An additional possible source of tension
is the publicity requirement contained in many of the state
statutes, including the Kentucky statute, requiring early dis-
closure of the terms of the proposed takeover bid."62 In the case
of exchange offers, in which the acquiring company offers its
own securities for the stock of the target company, this require-
ment could possibly conflict with the registration requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933,103 which prohibit the release of
information to investors in the case of an offer to sell securities
prior to the filing of a registration statement with the Securities
and Exchange Commission." 4 Whether these are viable objec-
tions to the state legislation will some day need to be resolved.
In the meantime, companies contemplating tender offers must
be particularly careful to take account of state as well as federal
law in planning their takeover strategy.'
5
'"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
'' See Moylan at 700-02.
12 See note 146, supra. New York dropped a requirement such as this from its
statute. See BNA SEc. REG. & LAw REP., No. 386, Sept. 1, 1976, at A-5. There is,
however, a registration requirement in the New York statute whereby an offeror must
file a registration statement containing certain prescribed information regarding a
tender offer with the state attorney general and the target company at least 20 days
before the making of the offer. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw, Art. 16, §§ 1602-1603, P-H CORP.
SERV., N.Y. 305-06 (1976).
,9 See § 5(c) of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1970). This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in inter-
state commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use
or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration
statement has been filed as to such security ....
"I Moreover, publicizing the terms of an exchange offer might not be considered
as within the limited disclosures exempted from § 5(c) under SEC Rule 135.17 C.F.R.
§ 230.135 (1976). For a case adopting such a position in regard to a press release
announcing the terms of an exchange offer, see Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor
Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970).
10 For a general discussion of tender offers and takeover strategy, see E. ARANow
& H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1973).
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